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Abstract 
From Foucault (1977) through to Cohen (1985) and Feeley and Simon (1992) 
criminological thinking about punishment has been dominated by penal rationalities 
of power and control. This has led to an under-theorised notion of the individual in 
criminology (Green 2011). As society and penality become increasingly ‘re-
emotionalised’ (Karstedt 2011) justice and punishment are invested with a new 
narrative and expressive dimensions. Drawing on Sartre’s (2010) existential 
philosophy about choice and authenticity and the social theory of Norbert Elias 
(2000) and Anthony Giddens (1986) the aim is to locate individual freedom and 
agency within these wider social conditions and through this begin to provide the 
basis for a broader conception for criminology of power that is both enabling and 
liberating as well as oppressive and controlling. 
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Resumen 
De Foucault (1977) a Cohen (1985) y Feeley y Simon (1992), el pensamiento 
criminológico sobre el castigo ha estado dominado por las racionalidades penales 
del poder y el control. En criminología, esto ha llevado a una noción del individuo 
infra-teorizada (Green 2011). A medida que se han “re-emocionalizado” la sociedad 
y la penalización (Karstedt 2011), se ha investido a la justicia y al castigo de una 
nueva dimensión narrativa y expresiva. Inspirándose en la filosofía existencial de 
Sartre (2010) sobre la elección y autenticidad, y la teoría social de Norbert Elias 
(2000) y Anthony Giddens (1986), el objetivo de este artículo es situar la libertad y 
acción individual dentro de estas condiciones sociales más amplias, para después 
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comenzar a ofrecer la base para una concepción más amplia de la criminología del 
poder, que sea tanto facilitadora y liberadora, como opresiva y controladora. 
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Simon Green   Transcending the Carceral Archipelago… 
 
Table of contents 
1. Introduction: the power of criminology ..................................................... 922 
2. Criminology, power and control ............................................................... 922 
3. Consumerism, identity and the narrative turn ............................................ 925 
4. Existentialism and power: freedom, authenticity and ethics ......................... 929 
5. Power, the individual and social theory: figuration and structuration ............. 932 
6. Conclusion: a new concept of power for criminology ................................... 938 
References ............................................................................................... 939 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 3 (2015), 919-944 
ISSN: 2079-5971 921 
Simon Green   Transcending the Carceral Archipelago… 
1. Introduction: the power of criminology 
I have come to the conclusion that the concept of power is very poorly understood 
or theorised in criminology. Overwhelmingly, power is seen as an oppressive 
strategy that is rooted in governmental and penal technologies of control. 
Everything seems to be squeezed into this explanation and everything is therefore 
seen as part of some nefarious plot to extend the power of the penal apparatus and 
its control over all of us. Or alternatively, power is either ignored or left unsaid; 
perhaps because criminology is an exercise in power itself or perhaps because 
power is perceived as a normative concept that is owned by a particular school of 
radical or critical criminology. Whichever criminological camp you fall in to and 
regardless of whether or not you use the concept itself, my contention is that it is 
firmly ingrained in the psyche of the discipline of criminology that power is always 
about control. Control is about authority and constraint and therefore focuses the 
criminological gaze upon structure rather than agency and leads to an under-
theorised conception of individual, or personal, power. As a consequence 
criminology fails to recognise other types of power that are located beyond the 
carceral and which can be understood in quite different ways. In particular, I shall 
explore individual and enabling power that stems from agency rather than 
structure. 
To make this argument I shall attempt to do three things. The first will be to chart 
the predominant use of power within criminology to demonstrate how power is 
understood, the normative basis of this understanding and the problems this 
presents to the criminological understanding of the dimensions and applications of 
power. The second will be to draw on a combination of sociological and 
criminological writings that increasingly foreground the individual, or ‘self’ within 
understandings of social and criminal relations and which are arguably linked to the 
re-emotionalization of criminal justice (Karstedt 2011). These approaches start to 
place private, or individual feelings and concerns back into penal decision-making 
(Green 2011) and consequently create a growing need for criminology to reengage 
with the individual. The third and final will be to reconceptualise theories of power 
within criminology to include individual agency as well as structural constraint.  
To achieve this final goal I shall draw on the existential thought of Jean-Paul Sartre 
(2007, 2010) and Simone de Beauvoir (1948) in an effort to redirect the 
criminological focus towards the individual and consider how personal ‘power’ or 
free choice can be constructed despite penal authority and social constraints. I shall 
then also draw on the social theory of Norbert Elias (2000) and Anthony Giddens 
(1986) to explore social theories that seek to reconcile structure with agency and 
which include a different conceptualisation of power that I shall argue can provides 
a corrective to criminology’s narrow and ultimately negative construction of power 
as control.  
2. Criminology, power and control 
My argument is that criminology conceives of power in rather narrow terms that 
reduces it to forms of structural and political power wherein one group, usually the 
state, the government, or its proxies exercises power over another group, the poor; 
the criminal; the citizenry. Underpinning this conception of power is usually an 
explicit or implicit Marxist leaning that power is rooted in economic relations which 
further suggests that criminology’s theory of power is normative as well as analytic. 
I am very aware that in making this claim I am opening myself up to the criticism 
that I am treating criminological thought in overly reductionist terms, so I shall try 
my best to make my case as carefully and clearly as possible. 
It is Michel Foucault (1977) who describes criminology as part of the disciplinary 
apparatus. Providing a combination of scientific credibility, or justification, for 
punishment with the psychiatric study of criminals designed to discipline and 
normalise, criminology is first conceived as part of the emerging nation-state’s 
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strategies of control (Garland 1992). Consequently, criminology had little to say 
about power or the critique of power during its formative years. Instead, it was part 
of the governmental system that sought to create a disciplined and conformist 
population. Garland (1992) does point to some limitations in Foucault’s (1977) 
analysis of criminological power, most notably his failure to acknowledge other non-
clinical forms of criminological project about crime trends, the evaluation of criminal 
justice agencies and victim studies. However, the point that is most relevant to this 
argument is that criminology in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth 
century ‘does not question the system of power of which it forms a part’ (Garland 
1992, p. 407). An emerging criminology therefore fails to develop a coherent 
framework for thinking about power. 
By any contemporary benchmark for criminology it would, of course, be absurd to 
suggest that criminology continues to remain ignorant of power or that it continues 
to only operate in the manner that Foucault (1977) describes. But the history, or 
genealogy, of criminology’s relation to power as outlined by Garland (1992) does 
remain instructive in one important way; contemporary criminology’s construction 
of power is rooted in the conditions of its emergence and the predominant focus of 
its enquiry. Accordingly, the criminological project constitutes power as control and 
is primarily concerned with power as the shaping of individual behaviour through 
governmental policies, practices and strategies of enforcement, confinement and 
correction.  
By contrast, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a burgeoning of 
radical and critical perspectives across the social sciences. A profound critique of 
the scientific methodology (Kuhn 1970, Feyerabend 1975, 1978) and the 
proliferation of radical neo-Marxist writings (e.g. Dahrendorf 1959, Althusser 1969, 
Gramsci 1971) emerged thick and fast from a range of celebrated schools of critical 
thought such as the Frankfurt School and the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (CCCS). The impact of this intellectual revolution on criminology 
was considerable and led to a range of insightful critical writing about the 
ideological construction of the law, punishment and the crime problem. The writings 
in this field are too numerous to mention but good summaries of research in this 
tradition can be found in Box (1983), Hall and Scraton (1981), Ryan and Sim 
(2007) though perhaps the two most celebrated contributions are Hall et al.’s. 
(1978) Policing the Crisis: mugging, the state, and law and order and Taylor et al.’s 
(1973) The New Criminology: for a social theory of deviance.  
One of the main characteristics of this phase of criminological thinking is an overt 
and deliberate attempt to redress criminology’s unreflective stance towards the 
power dynamics of both itself as a field of study and the field of study itself. In 
particular, two interrelated themes of ‘mystification’ and ‘domination’ emerge. 
Mystification (Box 1983) refers to the social construction of the crime problem in 
such a way that leads to the criminalisation and control of the powerless whilst 
ignoring the harmful behaviour of the powerful. Put simply, the ‘real’ crime problem 
is hidden by those in power who direct attention away from their own crimes by 
focusing attention onto others. Crucially, the ability of the powerful to identify and 
label (Becker 1963, Cohen 1973) others as criminal becomes a central explanation 
of how this crime problem is constructed (Mankoff 1976). Crime statistics, public 
debate and media representations of crime are all part of this process of 
mystification and all play a part in creating a perception of the crime problem that 
draws the eye away from harmful behaviour committed by those in authority. This 
particular analysis helped criminology to focus at least some of its attention on 
corporate crime and state crime and took further inspiration when the feminist 
movement began to uncover hidden sexual and domestic crimes against women 
(Smart 1976, Sim et al. 1987). The implication of this mystification is that social 
institutions are part of a deliberate attempt to serve the interests of one group at 
the expense of another. This perspective on power is reminiscent of Lukes’ (2005) 
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radical conception of the capacity of power to control fields of political action and 
awareness through the decision-making process. 
Domination refers to oppressive strategies put in place to criminalise and control 
and is concerned with coercive strategies of policing, prosecution and punishment 
(Hall and Scraton 1981). This perspective posits the law, the police, the courts and 
the penal system in the service of the state and against the interests of the working 
classes. The ascendant criminology of the 1960s and 1970s is thus built almost 
entirely in reaction to the Foucauldian (1977) analysis of a clinical, positivist 
criminology outlined above. Instead, a combination of neo-Marxist and post-
structuralist perspectives are drawn upon to tear apart the oppressive inequities 
inherent in criminal justice:  
In place of centralized state control: decentralization, delegalization, 
decriminalization, diversion, divestment, informal justice; in place of classification 
and professionalization: delabelling, deprofessionalization, decategorization, 
demedicalization, anti-psychiatry, self help; in place of segregation and 
incarceration: decarceration, prison abolition, deinstitutionalization, community 
care (or correction or treatment). (Cohen 1988, p. 12, emphasis in original)  
This is a fairly well-rehearsed phase in criminological thinking and my intention is 
not to critique or analyse it beyond demonstrating that the explicitly self-conscious 
analysis of power contained within this chapter of criminology is grounded on two 
distinct urges. The first is an attempt to escape the Foucauldian accusation that 
criminology is part of a system of control and the second, is to rectify this 
complicity by helping to critically uncover and dismantle the political economy of 
criminal justice and crime control. In service to these objectives, criminology draws 
on a normative theory of power that exists entirely as a strategy of control.  
One of the consequences of this radical phase in criminology’s development was a 
simultaneous and related growth of interest in resistance to power. Whilst by no 
means limited to radical perspectives the focus on conflict and power invited a 
concomitant reinvigoration of criminological interest in resistance to power. This 
focus on resistance included a wide range of commentaries that included theories of 
criminality as emerging forms of class consciousness (Taylor et al. 1973, Hall et al. 
1978), inmate subcultures (Cohen and Taylor 1972, Sykes 2007) and resistance to 
criminal justice authority (Quinney 1977, Cohen 1981, Storch 1981). During this 
period many influential texts that explore power, conflict and the legal order 
emerge that seek to analyse and expose the political economy of crime and criminal 
justice. Whilst each has its own particular focus they share a common interest with 
the resistance as a form of class conflict and place the state and its criminal justice 
system in conflict with a criminalised and exploited working class. This interest 
continues into contemporary criminology and a good example of it is the synoptic 
inversion of surveillance (Mathieson 1997) that has led to a reversal of the camera 
lens during public demonstrations (Greer and McLaughlin 2010) where political 
protesters have started to record policing behaviour at public demonstrations and 
set up ‘FIT-Watch’1 and ‘Cop-Watch’ schemes to record and monitor the police 
behaviour (Huey et al. 2006). Resistance is thus constructed in terms of power and 
control. Resistance is the green shoots of class consciousness and rebellion that 
must be suppressed and controlled coercively by the state through its criminal 
justice apparatus. Resistance is subsequently not external from this conception of 
power but part of it (Foucault 1991). Accordingly, resistance does not offer an 
alternative conception of power for criminology but remains part grounded in the 
political economy of control.  
The next stage in this whistle-stop tour of the criminological construction of power 
takes us to the social control literature that emerges during and after radical 
criminology. Analysed by Hall and Scraton (1981), Cohen (1985) and Simon (2009) 
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social control research moves beyond radical conceptions of power and resistance 
to consider the role of the state in shaping and creating order through increasingly 
more sophisticated technologies of control. Unlike radical criminology which locates 
the political economy of crime control in class conflict, social control includes a 
wider tapestry of possibilities that take as the object of enquiry governmental 
technologies of control. These tend to address questions about the role of the state 
and the strategies it uses to maintain order. Whilst these sometimes include 
radical, class-based explanations they are by no means limited to them. Following 
on from Cohen’s (1985) insightful analysis of left-wing inspired penal reform from 
the 1960s and onwards more recent developments in social control theory are 
exemplified by Feeley and Simon’s (1992) articulation of the ‘new’ penology and its 
actuarial management of risky groups. Other key contributions from O’Malley 
(2004) on prudentialism and Rose (1996, 2000) on advanced liberalism explore in 
more depth how government increasingly controls ‘through’ people. These dovetail 
with Foucault’s (1982 1991) own theory of governmentality which posits that state 
power is exercised by shaping the field of decisions through which active citizens 
make choices (Garland 1997). These approaches to social control therefore 
conceive the exercise of power as moving beyond coercive strategies of control that 
lead to conflict and resistance to strategies of cooption that overcome these 
dangers by inculcating individual choices into an unseen, and virtually undetectable, 
web of control into which we are all woven.  
The criminological treatment of power is therefore inextricably bound up with power 
as control. Perhaps this is unsurprising given that criminology is predominantly 
concerned with crime and criminal justice which inevitably draws the eye towards 
the state’s authority to coercively interfere in the freedom of its citizens through 
institutions of enforcement and punishment. Yet these are very particular, and not 
necessarily very representative types of institutions that arguably skew the 
criminological conception of power towards constraint and control. Anthony Giddens 
(1986) makes a similar point in his critique of Foucault’s (1977) construction of 
power and the total institution in which he claims that ‘complete and austere 
institutions are the exception rather than the rule within the main institutional 
sectors of modern societies’ (Giddens 1986, p. 154).  
Consequently, criminology has tended to work with a concept of power that is 
grounded on control. This is shaped by a history and object of enquiry that locates 
criminology within and about institutions of control. This has had the effect of 
creating a very narrow criminological conception of power that is ill-equipped to 
think about and understand how power operates in other fields. Agency is replaced, 
or reduced, to an expression of structural or political power through which control is 
achieved. Theories of criminality have almost exclusively been deterministic in the 
sense that crime is a consequence of physiology, environment or the power to 
criminalise. Criminology therefore tends to ignore other dimensions of power, and 
freedom, deployed elsewhere in philosophy and sociology. Power as agency, power 
as an enabling force, power as the freedom to act or achieve something are rarely 
given any space within the criminological frame of reference. Criminology is 
therefore constrained by its inhibitory conception of power. This leads to a very 
negative, almost dystopian (Cohen 1988) criminological critique of both the state 
and criminal justice reform. Power and control are seen as the property and 
purpose of the state and its agencies leaving individuals conceptually robbed by 
criminology of any real agency of efficacy.  
3. Consumerism, identity and the narrative turn 
Society has changed. Or rather, society is changing. Whilst care must be taken to 
avoid overstating these changes or slipping into historicism there is a weight of 
social theory and research across the social sciences that argues and demonstrates 
that change is afoot. Of course there is significant variation in the thinking about 
the nature and desirability of these changes and it is described differently 
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depending on who you read. As I have argued elsewhere (Green 2011, 2014) two 
of the most significant drivers of this social change in recent years are the cultural 
conditions often referred to as late-modernity and the political ideology often 
referred to as neo-liberalism. Both late-modernity and neo-liberalism have been the 
subject of extensive study and thought within both criminology and the social 
sciences more widely. Whilst it is not necessary to engage in a protracted 
discussion of the complexities of either body of research it is necessary to briefly 
rehearse a few key aspects of each before developing my own point in relation to 
both perspectives. 
Late-modernity is an attempt to theorise a phase of social change that sits between 
modernity and post-modernity. If modernity refers to the gradual change beginning 
in the Middle-Ages and accelerating during Enlightenment and industrialisation 
whereby traditional, agrarian, social and economic conditions are replaced by 
modern ones characterised by the birth of the nation-state, urbanisation, 
democracy, rationalisation, bureaucratisation and so forth then postmodernity is 
the replacement of these with something new. This something new is usually 
understood in terms of fragmentation and fluidity, a society in which absolute 
values or universal governing laws have been replaced by pluralistic and competing 
explanations and understandings of the world. No universal principles are provided 
as all knowledge is contextual, subjective and unfinished.  
Between these two perspectives late-modernity asserts that whilst social conditions 
may be moving beyond those of modernity it would be overstating the case to 
suggest that they have been replaced with post-modern ones. Instead, we are 
witnessing an intensification of modernity in which its social institutions develop in 
new and often unpredictable ways. Whilst there are many discussions of the 
changes associated with late-modernity and whilst they often take place in a variety 
of guises (Giddens 1990, 1991, Beck 1992, Bauman 2000) there a set of common 
themes that are often associated with late-modernity. These include insecurity, 
uncertainty, reflexivity, identity, consumerism and individualisation. It is the last of 
these themes, individualisation, which has a direct bearing on this discussion as it 
denotes the late-modern shift away from public and collective life towards the 
private and inward creation of self-identity. Individualisation is not, as often 
mistakenly assumed, meant to signify a growing selfishness in society but a shift 
towards the individual, rather than the group, as the centre of social relations.  
In contrast to late-modernity stands neo-liberalism which is normally understood as 
a political ideology or philosophy. Rooted in a commitment to individual liberty and 
market freedom neo-liberalism argues that an open, competitive market is the 
fairest means of redistribution and that government inhibits human freedom and 
creativity as the state is intrinsically coercive and therefore controlling (Hayek 
1960). Consequently, government should be kept to a minimum and the freedom of 
the market and the individual to a maximum. The purpose, according to neo-liberal 
thinkers like Hayek (1960), Nozick (1974) and Rawls (1971) of government is to 
ensure the sanctity of individual autonomy through the traditions of justice and the 
rule of law which are there to safeguard fair and equal forms of contract and 
exchange in the marketplace. Whilst there was, and is, significant variation and 
disagreement within neo-liberalism about exactly what are fair and just principles 
for the distribution of material goods in society (Kymlicka 2002) the shared 
allegiance of neo-liberal thinkers to a free and competitive market, the minimum 
state and individual liberty define this school of thought.  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that late-modernity and neo-liberalism are similar, 
they are not. One is born of social theory concerned to make sense of changing 
cultural conditions and the other is a political philosophy grounded on a normative 
commitment to a particular conception of the good society. Their methods, goals 
and objects of enquiry are entirely different and do not share any mutual sense of 
purpose or project. However, if it is accepted that at least some of the conditions of 
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late-modernity exist for at least some of the people living in highly developed 
societies and if it is accepted that neo-liberalism has been a pervasive political 
influence over the last 40 years in these societies then they arguably lead to some 
shared outcomes, in particular consumerism and individualisation. 
Consumerism, or the consumer society, is premised on the idea that consumption 
has replaced production and late-modern economies are driven by a ceaseless and 
endlessly unsatiated consumption of goods, lifestyles and fashions that are part and 
parcel of the creation and recreation of self-identity (Bauman 2005a, 2005b, 2007). 
Whilst the consumer society is therefore more than just the purchasing or 
exchanging of goods it does require, or is at least benefitted by, the personal 
freedom to choose, discard and replace self-identity and a strong, open and flexible 
marketplace in which to do this. Consequently, neo-liberalism helps to furnish the 
social conditions of late-modernity by asserting the primacy of a free market and 
creating the political conditions for its pervasive presence. By the same token, 
individualisation, as the inward looking process of self-identity creation is entirely 
compatible and indeed, fostered by neo-liberal politics of personal freedom. Whilst 
the social theory of late-modernity posits these trends in terms of changing social 
conditions emerging from advances in technology, globalisation and the decline of 
traditional kinship and community bonds, the political philosophy of neo-liberalism 
has fuelled these changes by valorising both individual autonomy and the free 
market.  
Furthermore, consumerism and individualisation are both aspects of self-identity 
creation. Self-identity is essentially personal story-telling that provides each of us 
with a narrative sense of who we are and how we present ourselves and connect 
with others. For example, I might have a personal narrative for myself as ‘family 
man’, which shapes how I see myself and how others see me, providing the basis 
for how I form bonds with other, similar people. Of course, I may have other 
aspects of this narrative that are either foregrounded or backgrounded depending 
on context. At work, I might foreground some other aspect of myself such as 
‘teacher’ or ‘researcher’. With my old school friends it might be ‘prankster’ or 
‘arguer’. When I’m in the North of England I may be ‘Cockney’, in London, I’m a 
North-Londoner, on holiday overseas I’m ‘British’. At Comic-Con I am ‘Batman’. 
These aspects of self-identity, or perhaps more accurately, self-identities, are the 
primary way in which we connect with others and create a sense of purpose, place 
and control in an increasingly insecure and uncertain world (Beck 1992, Giddens 
1991, Bauman 2000, 2005b). By creating these personal narratives we replace a 
lost, or declining, sense of place in the world that was previously given to us 
through concrete social institutions and social relations such as the family and the 
community. It is this loss that helps create a sense of insecurity and uncertainty 
and it is our corresponding creation of narratives that helps to replace it. As we get 
to increasingly choose our self-narratives we also get to increasingly destroy, 
replace and finesse them as we move through our lives. 
There are three reasons for making this point. The first is that late-modernity and 
neo-liberalism, despite their very different natures, create the conditions of 
individualisation, which can generally be understood as the process of constructing 
self-identity. The second is that this personal project of creating self-identity is 
primarily about creating personal narratives, back stories, or biographies that give 
us a sense of purpose, place and belonging. The third is that the process of doing 
this requires that we have the freedom to choose our self-identity and all that this 
entails with regards to choices about lifestyle, group membership, opinion and 
taste. This position shares much in common with the philosophically inspired 
conception of the ‘will to self-consummation’ developed by Crewe (2013) insofar as 
it is premised on the assertion that the ability to think biographically is itself a form 
of personal and creative power. To be entirely clear, this does not mean that all 
people are equally able to choose from an equally broad range of options and we 
are all bound to a greater or lesser extent by the conditions of our existence. By the 
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same token, neither does it mean that everyone is unbound from traditional roots 
of family, community, locality and the constraints that these bring with them. What 
it does mean is that regardless of the constraints and inequalities of each of our 
existences the opportunity, and space, to make meaningful choices about who we 
are is growing. This freedom, I wish to argue, is a type of power.  
This narrative self-determination contains within it a conception of individual power, 
or agency, that is absent from criminological thought. In some ways, this seems 
very odd, as criminology engages regularly and fruitfully with both late-modernity 
and neo-liberalism. For example, Garland’s (2001) research on the late-modern 
conditions of mass incarceration and Young’s (1999, 2007) polemics about the 
social and criminological dangers of late-modernity are testimony to this. Further, 
both desistance research and cultural criminology engage in full-blooded fashion 
with self-identity and late-modernity. Desistance theory has a core concern about 
how offenders re-write their personal narratives to become ex-offenders (Maruna 
2001, Farrall and Calverley 2006) whilst cultural criminology is concerned to 
understand the meaning and value people attach to both transgressive acts and the 
creation of criminal identities (Katz 1988, Ferrell et al. 2008). By the same token, 
Wacquant (2009) provides a penetrating analysis of the logic of neo-liberal penality 
whilst criminology has engaged in a sustained critique of neo-liberal crime control 
policies and their underpinning logic of the liberal actor, freely and rationally 
choosing this or that course of deviant action (Reiner 2007, Taylor 1999). This has 
led to a resurgence of both political interest and criminal justice policy about 
individual morality (Green 2014) and the re-emotionalization of both crime and 
criminal justice (Karstedt 2002, 2011). 
This interest in morality and emotions lacks a coherent theory of power to help 
explain agency and freedom and leads to confusion and contradiction within 
criminology’s treatment of the individual in both late-modernity and neo-liberalism. 
On the one hand, late-modernity is the cause of exclusion, criminalisation and 
incarceration (Young 1999, 2007, Garland 2001) whilst on the other it provides the 
space to write, or rewrite, self-identity with liberating and even transcendent 
benefits (Katz 1988, Maruna 2001, Ferrell 2005). Neo-liberalism is at the heart of a 
pernicious penal populism and popular punitiveness (Brake and Hale 1992, Bottoms 
1995, Wacquant 2009) but at the same time the criminological response to this has 
often implied a return to social and penal welfarism that places more power back 
into the hands of the coercive state that criminology has spent so long critically 
researching (Currie 1997, 2013, Young 2002, Reiner 2012). Of course, such 
contradictions within a discipline are both normal and healthy; reflecting different 
types of analysis, competing epistemological frameworks and normative 
standpoints.  
In making this point I am in no way wishing to make any comment about the 
comparative merits (or otherwise) of different criminological paradigms and 
although I am aware of the ongoing debate between experimental and cultural 
criminology (Ferrell 2004, Hayward 2007, 2012, Sherman 2009, Farrall 2010, 
Young 2011) my purpose is to illustrate that within criminology there is confusion 
about the role of the state and this confusion is grounded in criminology’s narrow 
conception of power. As I have argued, criminology’s notion of power is rooted in 
the structural and political power to control; power which is overwhelmingly located 
in the structures of the state. Other forms of social agency are therefore not usually 
identified or understood as forms of power at all and seen instead as social and 
cultural processes about, for example, the creation of self-identity.  
The consequence of this is that power is narrowly construed and narrowly focused. 
Criminology’s confusion about the role of the state is a good example of this 
because it demonstrates that there is no other outlet for considering the exercise or 
function of power beyond structures of control. Hence, the criminological conception 
of power is effectively funnelled upwards towards the state, creating an explanatory 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 3 (2015), 919-944 
ISSN: 2079-5971 928 
Simon Green   Transcending the Carceral Archipelago… 
 
bottleneck that means the state is the only institution with the power to both 
control and liberate. This confusion needs correcting and can be fairly easily 
achieved by drawing on wider frameworks about both power and freedom from 
philosophy and the social sciences. In particular, existentialism with its emphasis on 
individual freedom and figurational sociology and structuration theory with their 
emphasis on recasting the relationship between social actor and social institution 
can be usefully drawn upon to help broaden the criminological conception of power.  
4. Existentialism and power: freedom, authenticity and ethics 
There are three reasons why existential philosophy can help address questions of 
power for criminology. The first of these is that existentialism is explicitly about 
individual freedom and choice and therefore begins to provide a framework for 
focusing on personal power and the manner in which it operates. The second of 
these is that locates this power within the social constraints into which we are all 
born and exist. The third is that it contains the beginnings of a system of ethics 
through which the exercise of personal freedom can be achieved without damaging 
the equivalent freedoms of others. Existentialism therefore has the capacity to 
provide an interpersonal, socially situated and ethical conception of power. Whilst 
this perhaps sounds rather unlike how existentialism is often understood it is a 
perfectly reasonable articulation of existential principles.  
Existentialism is usually thought about in philosophical terms about what it is to be 
human. In particular, it is often seen as a challenge to orthodox philosophy that 
works on the assumption that there is some hidden truth about human nature that 
will eventually be divined through reason and logic. Existentialism begins from a 
different starting point, arguing that there is nothing that defines human beings 
beyond the lived reality of their everyday existence. This led Sartre in 
Existentialism is a Humanism (2007) to coin the phrase ‘existence precedes 
essence’ which is tantamount to a reversal of the more commonly held 
metaphysical position that there is some purpose or plan behind the creation of 
human beings. For Sartre (2007, 2010), this philosophical about-turn is driven by 
his atheism and a corresponding assertion that with no external or divine purpose 
driving our existence we are entirely free to decide for ourselves the path our lives 
take. This freedom allows us to ‘transcend’ the conditions of our existence and 
become something new. Or put differently, the thing which distinguishes human 
beings from animals is that we can change, or transcend, the world that we inhabit 
and create new forms of identity and purpose for ourselves over time. This led to 
another of his famous phrases that we are ‘condemned to be free’ by which he 
meant we must live with the responsibility that our decisions are ours alone and 
regardless of intended or unintended outcomes we must make our choices and live 
with the consequences of them. Exercising this freedom and making self-aware 
choices for ourselves is how we become some-thing, rather than no-thing; how we 
live an authentic and meaningful existence. The price of this existence is a constant 
anxiety about the choices we have to make in a world where we cannot know or 
rely on the outcomes.  
It is this concept of freedom that is important to questions of power. For Sartre 
(2007, 2010) we all have this freedom. It is integral to our existence. Exercising 
this freedom by making choices is how we transcend the mundane conditions 
imposed on us by social norms. Accepting that this freedom is always there and 
exercising it in a fashion compatible with who we are is how we live an authentic 
existence. For Sartre (2007, 2010) there is no circumstance in which we might find 
ourselves where we do not have this freedom. The slave can choose to run away, to 
rebel, refuse to work, or work extra hard for rewards and privileges not shared by 
other slaves. Writing in the aftermath of the Second World War this is a 
controversial claim. Sartre (2007, 2010) courts this controversy to some extent, 
criticising collaborators with the Nazi regime in France and attacking anti-Semitic 
attitudes. Yet how can a Jewish prisoner in a death camp or a member of the 
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French resistance being tortured by the Gestapo be in any way free? Sartre (2007, 
2010) argues that even in these most heinous of circumstances freedom remains. 
What Sartre means by this is very specific. His point is that even under torture the 
point at which we ‘break’ is a decision. Typically, this point is understood in terms 
of pain and circumstances beyond our control. But presumably we held out for 
some period of time. Why then, did we break at a particular point rather than 
earlier or later (by a second, minute, hour or day)? For Sartre all of the 
explanations that we might normally understand as entirely reasonable for 
‘breaking’ under torture are no more than excuses. This sounds very harsh and of 
course Sartre is perfectly well aware that the choice being made is not a good one. 
It is choice between more pain and capitulation. But it is a choice. The same is true 
for the death camp inmate, the slave, or indeed the prisoner. We do not all have 
the same range or quality of choices available to us but we do always have choices 
we can make. To deny them is to deny being a human, a form of moral cowardice 
in which we hide from the awfulness of our freedom and the anxiety it generates. 
Freedom is therefore a type of power. It is the power to make a decision, the power 
to act in one way or another. For Sartre (2010), acknowledging and using this 
power is an imperative that carries with it emotional and social consequences for 
yourself and others. In this sense, freedom is neither a painless nor politically 
constituted thing. It is not a right codified in a Constitution or articulated in a 
political doctrine. It is not having the same choices as other people. It is not being 
able to have a range of pleasing choices. It is simply accepting that there is always 
a choice. You always have the personal power to decide what to do. Even though 
the consequences might seem devastating insofar as some choices might lead to 
your death. Sartre (2010) argues this is still a choice. Of course, such choices are 
very difficult to make and as a result living a fully free existence is also very difficult 
and we seek ways of avoiding this freedom. In particular, we seek to hide from this 
freedom by creating structures that allow us to pretend to be free even though we 
then use them to give up our freedom. For Sartre (2010) God and religion are 
perfect examples of this; but more generally our social institutions, social norms 
and social relations are also forms of structure that we use to hide from our 
freedom. 
Existential power is about the freedom to choose. But this freedom is constrained. 
It is constrained by our own fears and anxieties; it is constrained by other people; 
and it is constrained by the conditions of our existence. Sartre (2010) calls these 
conditions, facticity, which means the facts of our existence. Key facts of our 
existence are our bodies and our inevitable deaths. Facticity also includes our 
personal biographies and past decisions. We cannot therefore decide to choose to 
be a bird and fly away. And if we self-deceive by seeking to explain our choices in 
ways that do not match up with our behaviour or seek to pass responsibility for our 
choices onto others then we act in ‘bad faith’ which, for Sartre (2010) is living an 
inauthentic existence. For example, if a man chooses to have an extra-marital affair 
then blames it on his wife for withholding affection or on his mistress for tempting 
him these would be examples of bad faith. As would, claiming that ‘you couldn’t 
help yourself’ and were compelled by biology, personal flaws or circumstances 
beyond your control to have sex with someone else. All of these things are, 
according to Sartre (1989, 2010) examples of an inauthentic existence because 
they deny personal freedom by reducing existence to the pressures of social 
conformity. 
A further dimension that can constrain our freedom is other people. For Sartre 
(2010), the other refers to the expectations of social conformity placed upon us by 
other people. These expectations impose all sorts of social norms about how we 
should behave. Sartre (2010) explains this imposition upon us in terms of how we 
imagine other people see us. This he calls ‘the look’ or ‘the gaze’ which is how we 
imagine others seeing us. This creates an external reference point to ourselves that 
objectifies us and makes us self-conscious as we imagine being watched by others. 
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It is this conception of the other that led Sartre in his play No Exit (1989) to 
famously say that ‘hell is other people’ (Sartre 1989, p. 45). The impact of the 
other’s imagined gaze is that we become locked in an endless struggle to reclaim 
ourselves from the objectification of others. Sometimes we can reclaim our sense of 
self by overcoming the social expectation and judgement contained in how others 
see us and at other times we become overwhelmed by our sense of how we are 
perceived by others. Our ability to exercise our freedom and make authentic 
choices is thus continuously locked in a battle with the constraints placed upon us 
by others. 
So whilst the existential position is that we all have freedom it is not unconstrained 
or uninhibited freedom. The exercise of this personal freedom is always governed 
by the facts of our existence, the social norms imposed by other and the anxiety 
generated by the responsibility freedom carries with it. Yet it is with unrequited 
doggedness that Sartre (2010) asserts that it is freedom that defines our being. 
Consequently, the existential position is one caught in a battle between social 
conformity and an authentic, free existence. Social conformity can be translated as 
external social pressures on the individual that come from the social norms and 
expectations of other people. Living an authentic existence means wrestling with 
and overcoming these external social pressures and making choices purely in 
reference to one’s sense of self. So living an authentic existence means not only 
makes choices but making choices unencumbered by social pressures. It is 
therefore the manner in which we make our choice rather than the choice itself 
which is important to the existential understanding of freedom. Freedom is making 
decisions based on what we decide we want without concern for what the social 
world expects of us.  
The problem with this is that it opens existentialism up to the criticism that an 
authentic existence is an immoral and unethical existence achievable only through 
a sociopathic disregard for other people and shared social norms. The implication of 
Sartre’s (2010) thinking is that if, for example, someone sat down and carefully 
decided that they genuinely wanted to go a murder spree; or if Adolf Hitler made a 
similarly thoughtful decision to invade Poland or exterminate all the Jews then in 
existential terms this would be at the heart of living an authentic existence. This 
criticism is something that both Sartre (2007) and his partner Simone de Beauvoir 
(1948) in The Ethics of Ambiguity were acutely aware of and sought to address in 
their later work. Whilst Sartre’s answer to this conundrum in Existentialism is a 
Humanism (2007) is perhaps not entirely convincing as he seems to contradict his 
earlier thoughts on freedom, Beauvoir (1948) in particular strives to locate an 
authentic existence within a framework of respect for the free and authentic 
existence of others. This, she argues is essential if we are to avoid reducing 
ourselves and others to mere ‘things’ which would then deny us all the ability to 
transcend the conditions of our existence. By beginning to shape an ethics of 
authentic freedom Beauvoir engages existential thought with the social world and 
the social relations contained within it. As a result, Beauvoir opens existentialism up 
to wider social questions about oppression and domination and much of her later 
work is about the oppression of women by men (Beauvoir 1997).  
Existentialism is about freedom and choice. It is an assertion that each of us has 
the power to transcend the conditions of our existence. Whilst rarely thought about 
as a theory of power there is an important lesson in existential thinking for 
criminology. This is that whilst we are all subject to a range of inner emotional and 
outer societal constraints we always retain the ability to exercise some aspect of 
choice regardless of circumstances. For Sartre (2010) this is central to his 
philosophy: freedom and choice are the human condition. When we deny our 
freedom and choice we stop being human. Hence, existentialism draws the 
criminological eye back towards how the individual experiences the constraining 
influence of the social world and how the individual escapes, or transcends it. This 
is more than a simple reaction or resistance to structural and political power but an 
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internal and autonomous process of reflection and identity creation. Sometimes it 
will be a reaction to authority other times it will be something new and unexpected. 
The existential perspective insists that the individual cannot be reduced to a simple 
tool of power and cannot be controlled by power unless they allow themselves to 
be. In other words, there is a different aspect to power than just control. Power can 
also be liberating and enabling. It can be positive and life-affirming. And it is always 
available regardless of how dreadful or limiting the circumstances someone finds 
themselves in.  
Within criminology these existential perspectives are most closely represented in 
desistance research and cultural criminology which share an interest in self-identity 
and narrative change. The writing and re-writing of personal scripts that allow 
people to transcend their offending past or ontological insecurities are 
fundamentally about taking control over one’s life and share much in common with 
existential thought. Yet, focusing on life-course and culture these perspectives tend 
to sidestep questions of personal power, preferring instead to locate explanations 
for going straight and transgressive lifestyle in the social and cultural conditions in 
which people exist. Consequently, individual agency as a type of power that can 
enable people to change both themselves and the social structures around them is 
rarely given much conceptual space within criminology as it is seen as both 
sociologically and normatively dubious and largely irrelevant to any explanation of 
social agency or social change. Nothing however could be further from the truth. 
Not only does existentialism locate individual freedom and choice within the 
constraints of the social world there exist at least two profoundly influential forms 
of social theory that do exactly the same.  
5. Power, the individual and social theory: figuration and structuration 
Norbert Elias (2000) and Anthony Giddens (1986) both provide distinctive forms of 
social theory that can bridge the gap between structure and agency and contain 
within them theories of power that go beyond standard criminological fayre. Whilst 
they are very different types of theory that are arguably explain the social world in 
quite different ways they share a common concern to locate the individual social 
actor within power relations that create and reproduce the social system. My 
purpose is not to try and combine the two or to artificially force them together but 
simply to point out that both provide conceptions of power that go beyond 
strategies of control. For Elias (2000) this is about interdependent networks of 
people whilst for Giddens (1986) this is about overcoming the distinction between 
structure and agency by conceiving the social actor as creating, sustaining and 
changing social structures. 
The work of Norbert Elias has received comparatively little attention within 
criminology though Hall (2007) and Ward and Young (2007) have explored the 
work of Elias in relation to the state’s control of violence and the pacification of 
people and spaces. The most common starting point for understanding Elias is his 
work on The Civilizing Process (2000) which is split into two volumes that deal with 
the development of manners and the concomitant establishment of the nation-
state. These two volumes provide the basis for figurational sociology by engaging in 
a micro-historical analysis of the process by which the aristocracy established a set 
of careful rules for Court-life that slowly formed the subtle nuances and behaviours 
that governed power relations at Court and through this the a wider system of 
etiquette that shaped social hierarchy and convention across the emerging nation-
state. Elias (2000) locates this process in the gradual process of the monopolisation 
of legitimate violence by the state and the pacification of space that this entails. An 
example that Elias (2000) uses to explain this process is the development of table 
manners, in particular the etiquette of bringing a knife to the King’s table which, 
during medieval times is primarily understood as weapon and therefore a threat to 
the peacefulness and security of the Court and, by extension, the state. Hence, 
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complex rules of etiquette emerge to govern what sort of knife is acceptable and in 
what context.  
These types of Courtly ‘manners’ are then gradually absorbed by wider society and 
become normalised and internalised as part of civilized behaviour. One of the first 
commonly recognised sets of manners that distinguished the nobility from the hoi 
polloi was that of chivalry which according to Elias (2000) emerged out of the 
Monarchy’s need to instil a set of values that limited when and how it was 
acceptable (or polite) for local war-lards (or knights) to use martial force. Chivalry 
thus brings a sense of etiquette to the use of violence and is part of the process of 
concentrating the use of this force in legitimate ways that both justify the use of 
violence on behalf of the Monarchy and delimit its use by others. This process is 
well illustrated in T. H. White’s fictional tale of Arthurian legend, The Once and 
Future King (1996) during which Arthur seeks to establish the knightly principle of 
chivalry: 
‘I have been thinking,’ said Arthur, ‘about Might and Right. I don’t think things 
ought to be done because you are able to do them. I think they should be done 
because you ought to do them.’ (White 1996, p. 261-262, emphasis in original) 
As Arthur seeks to wrestle control over the violent and warring knights in an effort 
to establish his Kingdom he seeks to differentiate his code of honour which is about 
only using violence in service of some higher good from that which the nobility have 
previously relied on which is whomever is the strongest is the rightest.  
Elias (2000) explains the emergence of the modern nation-state in terms of an 
ongoing process of establishing interdependent networks that regulate the use of 
violence and concentrate it in the hands of the state. For this to work, these 
manners are not imposed but assimilated over time. They become part of our sense 
of who we are and how we differ from others. This is what Elias (2000) calls the 
‘we-image’ which establishes our sense of group membership and owes much to 
Freud’s (2010) concept of the super-ego. As the nation-state burgeons more 
sophisticated strategies for communicating and ordering the rules of behaviour 
emerge and Elias (2000) also relies on Weber’s (1978) articulation of 
bureaucratisation as the basis through which this civilizing process extends outward 
through the formation of states.  
Whilst The Civilising Process (Elias 2000) is the most well-known and most 
frequently cited example of Elias’ thought perhaps the clearest articulation of his 
social theory can be found is a short essay by Elias at the beginning of The 
Established and the Outsiders (Elias and Scotson 1994) which explores the contours 
of the ‘established-outsider’ figuration in relation to a small working-class 
community in the midlands of England called Winston Parva. In this fascinating 
study Elias and Scotson (1994) explore relations between two working-class groups 
in one local community. One group, the established, has lived in the community for 
several generations longer than the other group, the outsiders, and therefore 
distinguishes itself as higher, and better, than the other. In his introduction to this 
study Elias provides a clear account of how power functions within and between 
groups and the basis on which this shapes the relationships and emotions of the 
members of each group. Elias conceives the relationship between the established 
and outsider groups as a balance of power with one group holding power over the 
other. In the example of Winston Parva, this power differential is drawn in terms of 
the older, established group being more cohesive and better organised. 
Consequently, it is able to represent itself better than the outsider group on various 
local committees and thus construes itself as superior to the outsiders. Elias argues 
that this established-outsider figuration in Winston Parva is the same configuration 
used by the aristocracy and ruling elites around the world to justify their superiority 
to the general population. Elias therefore locates one aspect of power in the 
cohesion and organisation of the group and its ability to assert its own interests 
over other groups.  
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This leads the established group to view the outsider group as inferior and 
attributes all sorts of negative connotations to it. In this way Elias articulates the 
interdependent group relations that lead to ‘social’ prejudice and the stigmatisation 
of the outsider group. The less organised and less cohesive character of the 
outsider group prevents it from effectively retaliating or asserting its equivalence 
with the established group and Elias argues that as long as the power differentials 
remain then the outsider group will remain stigmatised as inferior. This power 
differential is maintained and protected through a complicated process of exchange 
rituals enshrined in the dominant, established group. This operates at two levels, 
internal and external. At the internal level the established group protects its sense 
of superior social position through a complex set of interpersonal rules, or 
sensibilities, about how to behave towards each other. Members of the established 
group are prohibited from all but the bare essential (usually workplace based) 
fraternisation with the outsider group and are expected to conform to the ‘group-
specific norms’ (Elias 1994, p. xxiii) that are enforced through various types of 
social control and social censure that operates through systems of conversation and 
inflection, obligation and commitment, symbolism and intimacy. Rarely is censure 
explicit or overt but instead contained in the sensibilities, loyalties and general 
habitus of the group life. At the external level Elias argues that the outsider group 
can actually begin to adopt their stereotyped and stigmatised identity. If they are 
treated as dirty and aggressive they become dirty and aggressive. Depending on 
the extent of the power differentials this can sometimes be a form of disorganised 
retaliation or, more commonly, when the balance of power is very great it is an 
internalisation of identity given to them by the established group. Thus Elias uses 
this established-outsider figuration to explain the ‘fantasy’ stigma embedded in 
race, caste and class relations in general.  
One of the key motifs in Elias’ thought is how these power relations change over 
time. There is always a constant ‘tug-of-war’ between the established and outsider 
groups which involves ever more sophisticated nuances of power that act to 
constrain and restrain the outsider group from threatening the established group. 
But relations do change; sometimes the groups switch positions, perhaps due to 
significant change in economic fortunes or political representation which then leads 
to a new established group2. Consequently, power is always contingent and the 
ongoing ‘tug-of-war’ between the two groups means that power is always locked in 
reciprocal and interdependent networks both within and between groups. It is this 
conception of power that is of primary importance to the wider point I am trying to 
make. Elias uses power differently from criminology. Although he shares with 
criminology a sense that power is about control, power is also about balance. In 
other words, whilst one group may have power over another, power dynamics exist 
within and between groups and the balance of power can change, sometimes 
deliberately and overtly, sometimes serendipitously or by accident. Sometimes this 
change in the balance of power occurs because attempts to control or counter the 
threat of the outsider group and protect the status of the established group have 
unforeseen and unexpected contingencies that sometimes don’t emerge for many 
years. This conception of power differs from the criminological in two distinct ways. 
The first is that power is rooted in networks of interdependence which places power 
at the disposal and control of social actors who can use it for their advantage or to 
control others. The second is that power is unpredictable and contingent. It cannot 
be entirely harnessed and change can come about in new and unplanned ways, 
such as the emergence of a new social or political movement or the affects of 
technology on the ability of a group to organise themselves more effectively3. 
                                                 
2 For example, the continuing rise of alternative political parties in the recent 2014 European Parliament 
elections such as UKIP in the UK, Podemos in Spain and the National Front in France. 
3 For example, protest groups using social networking to co-ordinate their demonstrations. Or in the 
case of the 2011 London / England riots the capacity to use social networking to co-ordinate activities 
faster than the police could respond. 
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A second branch of social theory that offers a useful perspective on the concept of 
power is that offered by Anthony Giddens (1986) in his development of 
structuration theory. Structuration theory is Giddens’ (1986) attempt to reconcile 
structure and agency in understanding and explaining the social world. By 
attempting to overcome the dualism within sociology that deals with structure and 
agency as separate and reposition the relationship between the two as duality, 
Giddens’ (1986) contrives a social theory that locates structure and agency as part 
of each other. Structuration can be understood as uniting agency and structure by 
conceiving the social system as created and reproduced by social actors; refuting 
the traditional sociological conception of social structure as something external, or 
given to individuals. Similarly, Giddens (1986) presents agency as part of social 
structure rather than something located in individual autonomy. Instead, he 
argues, social structure only exists as a set of rules situated within the routinized 
and institutionalized everyday activities of human agents. As a result, social 
structure shapes social agency and vice versa. This approach allows Giddens (1986) 
to escape the distinction between macro and micro sociology and instead begin to 
explore the ways in which social agency creates, reproduces and changes social 
structure. Structuration can therefore be understood as the process of structuring 
the social system across time and space through pre-existing patterns of human 
agency that also change as individuals adapt and develop to changing 
circumstances4. 
This brings us to how Giddens (1986) conceptualises power. Whilst the 
existentialists see power in terms of freedom and choice (Sartre 2007, 2010) and 
Elias (1994, 2000) sees it as balance and contingency, Giddens (1986) construes 
power in terms of the ability to act. Given that his structuration theory is about the 
ways in which social actors create, reproduce and change social structure his theory 
of power needs to provide social actors with the space to exercise choice in a 
meaningful way that conceives social actors as possessing intrinsic power. In this 
sense, Giddens (1986) shares some common ground with the existentialists and 
Elias as he invests his conception of power with a ‘dialectic of control’ (Giddens 
1986, p. 16) that asserts ‘all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby 
those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors’ (Giddens 
1986, p. 16). In this way, Giddens (1986) builds power as something invested in 
social actors as well as social structures. This is unsurprising given his broader 
project of structuration but it does begin to provide a helpful distinction between 
power as domination over others and power as the ability to act. Giddens (1986) 
argues that both types of power exist but that structural sociology has been too 
quick to reduce questions of power to questions of domination. To be clear, Giddens 
(1986) is in no way arguing that power isn’t about domination but that it is not only 
about domination. It is also about social agency, which is the ability to do (or for 
that matter, not to do) something, indeed anything, in pursuit of a particular goal. 
Consequently, agency is power. 
Within this framework, Giddens (1986) distinguished between resources and power. 
Resources are the various different media through which power is exercised 
through social institutions (which of course are reproduced by social actors) and the 
way in which some groups seek to pursue their self-interested goals by hoarding or 
manipulating these resources. Hence, power is not a resource in itself, and in this 
way Giddens (1986) seeks to demonstrate that power is not something that can 
simply be controlled by one group over another. Social actors are part of the social 
structure and thus retain the ability to act regardless of their access to resources. 
In structuration theory therefore power is not external to social agency or social 
structure but exists in them and through them. Power is invested in social agency 
                                                 
4 Whilst the relationship between time and space is integral to Giddens’ (1986, 1990, 1991) social theory 
about the development of the city and modern social relations it is only of passing relevance to the 
argument I am trying to construct about power. For the purposes of this discussion it is not therefore 
necessary to explore time and space relations further. 
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which is integral to social structure. Accordingly, social actors cannot be reduced to 
docile bodies, ground out by social institutions and turned into ‘autonoma’ (Giddens 
1986, p. 16) but instead contain both autonomy and dependence within and across 
social relations and social contexts. Hence, by distinguishing between resources and 
power Giddens (1986) neatly sidesteps the ‘zero-sum’ game of power and control 
and therein creates the terms in which the social actor will always retain the 
capacity to affect change. Without this separation, structuration theory would not 
work as it would leave open theoretical space for social agency to be dominated by 
structure thereby denying their co-existence as the one would effectively render the 
other obsolete. 
Within criminology Farrall and Bowling (1999) and Jewkes (2002) use structuration 
theory to help analyse the experience of offenders and the relationship between 
identity, agency and structure in navigating either desistance from crime or the 
prison environment. Farrall and Bowling (1999) provide a thoughtful and interesting 
application of Giddens’ (1986) structuration theory but seem uncomfortable with 
Giddens’ concept of power on the grounds that it doesn’t provide any sense of how 
power is differentiated between individuals and social groups. They go on to 
comment that Giddens’ (1986) fails to acknowledge power differentials either 
between individuals and groups or across the life-course of an individual. This is an 
important point and one that is often raised by criminology about any exposition of 
power that does not contain some sense of the social, cultural, or indeed personal 
constraints that shape and inhibit opportunities. But it also belies the central 
concern of my argument which is that criminology is primarily and overwhelmingly 
concerned with, as Stewart (2001) puts it ‘power-over’ others. This needs 
unpacking further.  
Whilst Farrall and Bowling (1999) are quite clear that Giddens’ (1986) articulation 
of structure is both constraining and enabling they seem to struggle far more with 
his conception of power as the same despite the fact that the two are requisites of 
each other in his social theory. This discomfort appears to be premised on a sense 
that Giddens’ (1986) conception of power doesn’t provide a framework for thinking 
about power differentials, and simplistically treats power as the ability to ‘act’. In 
other words it doesn’t deal with constraints on the ability to act5. This is based on 
an argument made by Bauman (1989) who criticises Giddens (1986) failure to 
properly situate social actors within a network of interdependencies and concludes 
by suggesting that Elias (2000) might offer a more fruitful alternative for a social 
theory that blends structure and agency. This is an important critical limitation 
within Giddens’ (1986) work but in the context of theorising power it is in danger of 
overlooking what Giddens (1986) is seeking to achieve in his construction of power. 
Whilst Giddens (1986) may not robustly engage with these questions he is in no 
way denying that people and groups have differential access to, and experience of, 
life choices; only that power is separate from the resources that govern these 
choices. Individuals cannot therefore ever be robbed of some level of interpersonal 
power. Elias (2000) in fact makes a virtually identical point though he articulates on 
different terms, as I have demonstrated above. Accordingly, for both Elias (2000) 
and Giddens (1986) power is interdependent and based on the every-day routines 
and institutions of social actors. The difference is Giddens (1986) deliberately 
separates power from its distribution so that he can uncouple the individual agent 
from structural control thereby liberating the individual from a Foucauldian (1977) 
conception of power as control. This facilitates a different point of entry for social 
analysis that can investigate power outside of constraint and as a type of social 
force that is not solely about domination but also about emancipation. Hence, for 
Giddens (1986) domination requires the investigation not of power but of resources 
which he categorises under the two broad headings of ‘allocative’ (the organisation, 
production and distribution of natural resources and the material goods) and 
                                                 
5 An argument persuasively developed by Margaret Archer (1988, 1995) 
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‘authoritative’ (the organisation, production and distribution of social relations and 
life-chances). 
When looked at this way what emerges is a very different conception of power 
being used by Giddens (1986) to that conventionally used by criminology. Farrall 
and Bowling’s (1999) discussion of structuration and power is illustrative of this 
difference between the conception of power used in the social theory of Giddens 
(1986) and a narrower definition more commonly used by criminology. To be clear, 
this is not meant as a critique of Farrall and Bowling (1999) who provide an 
insightful analysis that draws on structuration theory to help understand desistance 
opportunities over the life-course. Rather, it is a useful illustration of the difference 
between a social theory with a broader conception of power and criminology’s 
difficulty in accepting this within its own terms of reference that views power as a 
force of control and constraint. Further, if this was just the lone voice of Anthony 
Giddens (1986) criminology could perhaps dismiss this broader conception of power 
but, as I have tried to demonstrate, power as an enabling force can also be found 
in the existential thinking of Jean-Paul Sartre (2010) and the figurational sociology 
of Norbert Elias (2000). Furthermore, recent research by Stewart (2001) and Drake 
(2010) alongside a useful companion text by Scott (2001) further reinforce and 
articulate the distinction between ‘power-over’ others and ‘power-to’ act (Stewart 
2001). Drake (2010) presents this as the difference between ‘constituted’ power, 
which is structural and state power to act over and upon others and ‘constitutive’ 
power, which is agency and civil society power to act. Scott (2001) usefully 
summarises these various sociological and political conceptions of power by 
distinguishing between elementary forms of power, power as domination, power as 
counteraction and interpersonal power.  
Criminology seems rooted in the type of power relations discussed by Stephen 
Lukes (2005) in his classic text Power: A Radical View in which he discusses the 
three dimensions of power in terms of the capacity of one person or group to 
exercise power over another person or group. Lukes’ (2005) conceptualises power 
as a field of activity in which one group shapes and controls the political agenda 
through decision-making and non-decision-making processes. His third dimension 
of power is the capacity to either put things on the political agenda or keep them 
off; thereby controlling not only issues and conflicts themselves but also the 
construction of them. This third dimension has a definite Marxist underpinning and 
Lukes (2005) introduces the notion of latent conflict whereby the interests of one 
group is either unable to express, or even unaware, of their interests. This 
conception of power is critically useful in helping to understand the way in which 
power has the capacity to shape fields of political and social thought and action and 
strongly resonates with the discussion in criminology about the state driven social 
construction of ‘crime problems’ that is particularly well-articulated by critical 
theorists such as Box (1983), Hall et al. (1978) and Taylor et al. (1973) and 
zemiologists such as Hillyard et al. (2004), Muncie (2000), Shearing (1989) and 
Swaaningen (1999). Hence, this is a self-avowedly radical perspective of power that 
locates its exercise in social structures that are treated as a form of political power 
and authority that are used by one group against another.  
It is tempting to embark on a fuller critique of Lukes’ (2005) theory of power but at 
this stage I feel it is enough to say that whilst this theory of power predominates in 
criminology it only represents one face of power and there is another contained 
within an established and convincing body of ideas that provides a broader, and 
therefore more comprehensive, framework for thinking about power. This 
perspective provides the second face of power which is power as the capacity to 
act. This second face is therefore enabling and vested in both agency and structure 
and consequently has the potential to provide new avenues of enquiry and analysis 
for criminology that can help it escape the conceptual cul-de-sac it has created for 
itself with regards to social control and the power of the state. 
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6. Conclusion: a new concept of power for criminology 
The purpose of the above discussion has been to explore the social theory or 
Norbert Elias (2000) and Anthony Giddens (1986) which provide two key 
perspectives on social theory that place social actors within the production of social 
structures, social institutions and social relations. When positioned alongside the 
existential thinking of Sartre (2010), a philosophy and social theory of agency, 
power and choice emerges that stands in sharp contrast to the criminological 
conception of power as control. Whilst none of these perspectives ignore the 
dynamics of control or posit power purely as enabling, they all provide the 
conceptual space for a fuller theory of power that entertains both enabling and 
constraining aspects. This is particularly appealing on a number of grounds.  
Firstly, I have argued that criminology has a rather narrow conception of power 
that is rooted in its own history and relationship to power. This narrowness tends to 
either implicitly or explicitly treat power as control which leads to an analytical and 
conceptual bottleneck where the state becomes both the source of oppressive 
control and the solution to it. Hence, by pointing to the interpersonal and 
sometimes enabling aspects of power the intention is to provide alternative starting 
points for thinking about the exercise and function of power in relation to both 
explanations of criminality and people’s experience of, and relationship to, criminal 
justice and penal sanctions.  
Secondly, perspectives on freedom, choice and individual agency provide a useful 
way of exploring the increasingly emotionalised, individualised, and therefore 
personalised dimensions of late-modern culture and its increasing influence upon 
transgressive behaviour and penal decision-making (Karstedt 2011, Green 2014). A 
concept of power that is not only conceived as an instrumental strategy of control 
provides criminology with a wider lens for thinking about the cultural and symbolic 
significance crime and criminal justice represent with regard to both rule-breaking 
and rituals of punishment and exclusion. For example, punishment, and reactions 
to punishment can then be explored as forms of personal creativity, expression, 
performance and emancipation. The balance of power and the influence upon how 
penal systems change can then be understood in terms of how people adapt, react 
and give meaning to those systems of punishment. This then becomes a valuable 
critical tool for understanding how, for example, restorative justice or community 
penalties have developed in recent years. Not just as strategies of power and 
control but also as fields of drama, story-telling, connection and redemption. Anger, 
love, loathing and forgiveness all contain significance and meaning beyond the 
exercise of control from outside or above. The theatres of criminality and criminal 
justice can thus be construed as beyond formal strategies of social control if social 
actors are part of an ongoing process that creates and changes social institutions 
and social structures.  
Thirdly, this broader conception of power posits that human beings can never be 
reduced to mere puppets of the state but always retain the power to act in some 
shape or fashion and regardless of the constraints in which they find themselves. 
None of this precludes or rejects ongoing critical analysis of the state as an agent of 
control but it does provide a balancing point to this analysis that begins to think 
seriously about power as something beyond control. This suggests two interrelated 
possibilities. One, that the social institution of criminal justice is invested with 
purpose and meaning beyond control and two that even if it exists purely for the 
purpose of control people are not determined to be controlled by it and may make 
choices that are quite outside of those expected or intended. Foucault’s (1977) 
imagery of a carceral archipelago in which the panoptic gaze controls us all through 
our social institutions is therefore fundamentally flawed. The standard 
criminological critique of this is that people will find ways to avoid or exist outside 
of the controlling gaze of the panopticon (Short and Ditton 1998, McCahill 2002, 
Marx 2003) but the problem runs much deeper than this. If, as both Elias (2000) 
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and Giddens (1986) argue, social structures do not exist outside of social actors 
then the system itself is a product of both structure and agency. Changes within it 
are then products of changes in how people behave and interact that arise out of 
wider changes in social conditions. This makes it impossible for a panoptic system 
of control (or for that matter, any system of control) to exist externally from the 
socially constituted patterns of routinized behaviours and relations that are shaped 
through the reflexive process of creating and recreating social identities. 
Consequently, power as control can only ever be partial and contingent and 
therefore demands equal attention to its enabling qualities as much as its 
constraining ones. Doing so provides criminology with an alternative starting point 
for analysing power in both criminal and penal processes. 
Fourthly, and perhaps even more fundamentally, power as enabling can act as a 
corrective to the often miserable, and largely dystopian, criminological explanation 
of the history of penal reform which presents such reform as an extension of the 
state’s control over all of our lives and opinions about punishment. Just as 
desistance and cultural criminology researchers have re-invigorated criminological 
debate about how we give meaning and take self-worth from deviance and the 
rejection of it; there is no reason why the same approach cannot also be applied to 
harm, victimisation, punishment and fear. This may sound odd to the ears of many 
criminologists given there are generally more people in prison, more prisons, more 
people being punished in a greater variety of ways, more CCTV cameras and more 
alarms, locks and gates to prevent crime. However, my point is that criminology 
generally understands and explains these things in terms of how bad they are; how 
they demonstrate pernicious state control and an intolerant public driven to 
punitive extremes by a reactionary press and pervasive sense of largely 
unwarranted fear. All of this seems predicated upon a normative belief that 
punishment is somehow intrinsically bad and people are somehow driven to equally 
bad, irrational and condemnatory attitudes by ignorance and fear. This is because 
the narrow criminological concept of power has robbed us of an explanation 
wherein people are able to exercise enabling power and make deliberate and 
conscious choices that they might, in fact, want things the way they are and that 
this ‘want’ cannot be explained purely in terms of how our fields of thought and 
action are shaped by structural forces seeking to control us. This may be an 
uncomfortable possibility for criminology. It may be that we would like it to be 
otherwise. But I’m even less comfortable with a criminology that seeks to dismiss 
people with attitudes and values other than those endorsed by criminology as the 
passive victims of external control; thereby denying people who hold different 
views authentic ownership of them. Ironically, given where Foucault (1977) argues 
the origins of criminology may be found, this seems the very definition of 
domination itself.  
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